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EXEcuTIVE SUMMARY

The sixth amendment guarantees to the accused in a criminal
prosecution the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." In Massiah v. United States,' the Supreme Court held
this right was violated when there was used against the defendant at trial evidence of incriminating statements deliberately
elicited from him by an informant after he had been indicted
and in the absence of counsel. In effect, this decision and others
that 'followed have created a new constitutional right not to be
questioned about pending charges prior to trial except in the
presence of an attorney.
One consequence of the Massiah line of cases is that federal
and state investigators may not use otherwise legitimate investigative methods to obtain incriminating statements from a person once he has been charged with a crime. Another is that federal and state prosecutors may not introduce at trial probative,
reliable, and voluntary admissions of guilt by the defendant.
The overall result is that the search for truth in criminal investigations and trials is thwarted.
A.

The Massiah Line Of Cases

Apart from Massiah itself, the principal Supreme Court cases
on the right not to be questioned in the absence of counsel are
Brewer v. Williams,2 United States v. Henry,' and Maine v.
Moulton.4 In Williams, the Court explained that Massiah prohibits not only surreptitious questioning of a charged defendant
.in the absence of counsel, but also conduct by known police officers that-while not constituting "interrogation" in the traditional sense-is deliberately and designedly intended to obtain
incriminating evidence. Henry ruled that Massiah's "deliberately elicited" test was satisfied when the government created a
'situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating
statements to a fellow prisoner who was acting as a paid informant. Finally, Moulton held that Massiah's prohibition applied
even though the defendant's inculpatory remarks to a cooperating codefendant were obtained during an investigation of crimes
1.
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4.

377
430
447
474

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

201
387
264
159

(1964).
(1977).
(1980).
(1985).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL.

22:3 & 4

by the defendant other than those with which he had already
been charged.
B.

Critique Of The Massiah Line Of Cases

The Massiah doctrine and its exclusionary rule enforcement
mechanism have no support in history, logic, or considerations
of sound public policy.
1.

The Massiah Right Not to Be Questioned

As a historical matter, Massiah has no basis in the common
law view of the right to counsel, or in the modified version of
that right adopted in the American colonies, or in the apparent
understanding of the right on the part of those who proposed
and ratified the sixth amendment. Throughout the entire period
of its development prior to 1932, the right to counsel was regarded as no more than a guarantee of the assistance of retained
counsel at trial.
The original meaning of the right to counsel has been expanded dramatically over the past half century by Supreme
Court decisions that have interpreted the sixth amendment as
mandating the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants
and requiring the assistance of counsel at certain "critical" pretrial stages of criminal proceedings. These decisions have been
justified by reference to the core purpose of the sixth amendment-ensuring the fairness of trials and the integrity of the
truth-finding process-and to the traditional role of an attorney
in achieving this purpose by helping the accused cope with legal
complexities and with the advocacy of a skilled and experienced
prosecutor.
But even those decisions requiring the assistance of counsel at
"critical" pretrial stages do not support the Massiah rule. When
the government attempts surreptitiously to obtain incriminating
statements from an indicted defendant, the accused is not exposed to legal questions, complex or otherwise; he is not confronted by an expert adversary; and there is no reason to believe
that his voluntary self-incriminating statements are untruthful.
There is, therefore, no sound basis for concluding that counsel is
necessary to act as a "medium" between the accused and the
government to protect the accused from unfairness at trial or
from the risk of conviction on the basis of unreliable evidence.
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None of the other justifications that have been offered for the
Massiah doctrine are persuasive. The right not to be questioned
is not needed to protect the defendant's fifth amendment right
against compulsory self-incrimination, because no element of
compulsion exists when a person not in custody chooses to confide in someone who he does not believe to be a government
agent. Nor is such a right necessary to prevent "overreaching"
by the government. Surreptitious questioning, which is entirely
lawful before indictment, cannot fairly be characterized as
"overreaching" when it occurs after indictment, because it does
not expose the defendant to any danger against which the sixth
amendment was intended to protect. Finally, it begs the question to argue that Massiah prevents unfairness by forbidding
the government from using deception to prevent a defendant
who is entitled to legal assistance from availing himself of that
right. That argument assumes that a person who has been formally charged has a right not to be questioned without his attorney present.
The Massiah doctrine is, in fact, merely a cover for a judicially-imposed policy against the use of post-indictment confessions and admissions. That policy is unwise because it precludes
the use of otherwise legitimate and fruitful investigative techniques to obtain evidence that may be necessary to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, because it may endanger the public
by causing the authorities to delay arrests or indictments in order to complete their investigations, and because it impairs the
administration of justice by inhibiting voluntary admissions of
guilt.
2.

The Massiah Exclusionary Rule

Even if there were adequate justification for the Massiah right
not to be questioned, there would be no basis for Massiah's automatic exclusionary rule. That rule has no independent constitutional basis-it is merely a judicially-created device for enforcing a constitutional right. As such, its use can be justified only if
its benefits outweigh its costs. In fact, the costs plainly exceed
the benefits:
The substantial costs of Massiah's exclusionary rule include
the impairment of the truth-finding process that results from
suppression of reliable and probative evidence of guilt, the consequent release or lenient treatment of obviously guilty defendants, and the generation of public disrespect for a system that
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shields criminals from the consequences of incriminating statements made voluntarily to confederates in crime.
On the other hand, suppression produces precious little in the
way of offsetting benefits, other than to reward defendants with
windfalls that are wildly disproportionate to the gravity of the
violations involved. The gain to society in terms of deterrence of
unlawful police conduct is insubstantial, if it exists at all, because in most cases, it is difficult to conclude that the police
were guilty of any misconduct, let alone serious transgressions.
Moreover, just as in the fourth amendment area, there exist
equally effective but less costly deterrent and remedial alternatives to the suppression of evidence-administrative guidelines,
training requirements, disciplinary sanctions, and civil suits for
damages.
C.

Potential Reforms And Implementing Strategies

The Department of Justice should seek reform of the Massiah
doctrine on the grounds that it is irrational and harmful to effective law enforcement, as well as subversive of the search for
truth in criminal trials. Reform could be pursued either by a direct attack on the Massiah right not to be questioned, or by an
effort to eliminate or modify Massiah's exclusionary rule enforcement mechanism. Success on either front would not impair
the value of the sixth amendment right to counsel at trial or
during pretrial confrontations at which the assistance of an attorney serves the purposes of the sixth amendment.
A frontal assault on the constitutional right created by Massiah does not seem promising at this time, however. Several
years ago, the Court declined the government's invitation to reconsider Massiah's novel view of the sixth amendment right to
counsel, and it has reaffirmed that view repeatedly in more recent decisions. Moreover, in one of these recent opinions, the
Court expressly rejected the argument that Massiah should not
apply when the police are engaged in a bona fide investigation of
new criminal activity by an indicted defendant.
An approach that holds somewhat greater promise for more
immediate success would be to pursue judicial or legislative
elimination or modification of Massiah's exclusionary rule. In
addition to making the usual arguments for complete abolition
based on a balancing of the costs and benefits of suppression,
the Department could argue for the same result on the basis of
an existing statute-18 U.S.C. § 3501. The argument would be
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that section 3501, which restored the pre-Mirandatest of voluntariness for the admissibility of confessions, forecloses suppression of voluntary incriminating statements, even if they are
made after indictment and in the absence of counsel. There is a
sound basis in the statute's text and legislative history for this
argument. Alternatively, we could argue for recognition of a
"good faith" exception to Massiah's exclusionary rule for situations in which the police obtain incriminating statements concerning a charged offense during a legitimate investigation of
other criminal activity by the defendant.
To achieve reform in this area of the law, it is recommended
that the Department consider the following litigative, legislative,
investigative, administrative, and educational strategies:
1. Litigative Strategy
The Department should continue to take advantage of litigative opportunities to express its fundamental disagreement with
the notion that the sixth amendment includes a right not to be
questioned in the absence of counsel. In addition, the Department should urge judicial elimination or modification of Massiah's exclusionary rule.

2. Legislative Strategy
The Department should consider the advisability of seeking
legislation-as part of a broader criminal procedure reform
package-specifically abrogating the Massiah exclusionary rule,
either completely or in cases in which incriminating statements
concerning charged offenses are obtained during bona fide investigations of crimes with which the defendant has not yet been
charged.
3. Investigative and Administrative Strategy
The Department should continue to utilize electronic surveillance and passive informants to gather incriminating statements
from an indicted defendant concerning the pending charges
when necessary to amass sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. The Department should also
make use of informants to elicit evidence concerning the partici-
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pation of indicted defendants in additional criminal activities,
even when there is reason to believe that the defendants may
make incriminating statements about the offenses with which
they have already been charged. The Department's guidelines
and procedures for the use of these investigative techniques
against persons under indictment should be reviewed and modified if necessary. In addition, the Department should review,
and improve if necessary, existing administrative mechanisms
for monitoring post-indictment investigations and for imposing
appropriate disciplinary sanctions in the event of serious noncompliance with the guidelines and procedures.
4. Educational Strategy
The Department should undertake a "consciousness raising"
campaign aimed at making the Massiah doctrine a more visible
public issue by exposing the unsatisfactory state of the law in
this area. This campaign, which should be waged in scholarly
journals, newspapers, and speeches, should emphasize the distinction between the right to counsel established by the Founders in the sixth amendment and the right not to be questioned
created by the Court in Massiah,thereby making it clear that an
attack on the latter does not threaten the continued vitality of
the former.
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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO COUNSEL UNDER THE MASSIAH
LINE OF CASES

INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides in part that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ...

to have the Assistance of

Counsel for his defence." In Massiah v. United States," and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted this guarantee
to prohibit law enforcement officers from using undercover techniques to elicit incriminating statements from an accused in the
absence of counsel after the initiation of judicial proceedings,
and to require the exclusion of statements so obtained at the
defendant's trial. In so interpreting the right to counsel provision, the Court has, in effect, conjured up a new right not to be
questioned in the absence of counsel. By foreclosing the use of
otherwise legitimate investigative methods to obtain probative,
reliable, and voluntary statements for use as evidence at trial,
this interpretation plainly impedes the search for truth in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
The Office of Legal Policy has undertaken a review of the law
relating to the sixth amendment right to counsel, with particular
attention to the development of, and the justification for, the
Massiah doctrine. The results of this review are set out in this
Report.'
Part I of the Report traces briefly the history of the right to
counsel from its origins in the Middle Ages to the beginning of
5. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
6. This Report is part of a general, ongoing reexamination of the law governing criminal investigation and adjudication being conducted by the Office of Legal Policy to identify features of contemporary procedure that unduly hinder the search for truth in criminal cases and to. develop specific recommendations for eliminating or alleviating such
impediments. Earlier reports in this series have examined the law of pretrial interroga-

tion,

OFFICE OF LEGAL POuCY,

U.S. DEP'T

OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES,

No. 1, The Law of PretrialInterrogation (1986), [hereinafter REPORT No. 1],
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989), and the search and seizure exclusionary
rule, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES,
REPORT No. 2, The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule (1986), [hereinafter REPORT
No. 2], reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989).
REPORT
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its modern development in Powell v. Alabama.7 This examination demonstrates that the Massiah doctrine has no historical
support in the common law right to counsel, in the original intention of the proponents of the sixth amendment, or in the
sparse jurisprudence on the subject in the ensuing 150 years.
Part II reviews the modern development of the right to counsel,
with particular attention to the formulation and application of
the Massiah doctrine. Part III, a critical analysis of the Massiah
rule, develops two points: the right not to be questioned, created
by Massiah, cannot be justified by arguments based on history,
logic, or considerations of sound public policy, and-even if justified-should not be enforced by the exclusion of probative and
reliable evidence at trial. Finally, Part IV discusses potential reforms and recommends implementing strategies. One of the conclusions is that elimination or modification of the Massiah right
not to be questioned is not a realistic goal at this time, even
though its achievement would not impair the right to counsel at
trial or in pretrial contexts in which an attorney's presence
would fulfill the purposes of the sixth amendment. A more important conclusion is that some restriction of Massiah's exclusionary rule enforcement mechanism may be attainable through
the use of recommended litigative, legislative, and educational
strategies. In addition, Part IV outlines suggested investigative
measures designed to take full advantage of exceptions to the
Massiah doctrine, as well as administrative steps to create a
clear deterrent alternative to Massiah's exclusionary rule.
I.

THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The right to counsel as it now exists had no counterpart at
common law. From at least the early twelfth century to about
the middle of the eighteenth century, felony defendants were
not entitled to be represented by counsel except in pleading
matters of law at trial. This restriction was apparently based on
the belief that such persons posed especially grave dangers to
the Crown. In contrast, defendants in misdemeanor prosecutions
and civil cases were allowed to present a full defense through
counsel at trial. This same right was extended to defendants in
treason cases by statute in 1695, no doubt because members of
Parliament could readily imagine being accused of treason themselves. During the latter half of the eighteenth century, English
7. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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judges began to give defense counsel in felony cases greater latitude by interpreting the concept of "questions of law" to include
direct and cross-examination of witnesses at trial. However, the
earlier, more restrictive approach was not formally abandoned
until a statute of 1836 authorized the presentation of a full defense at felony trials by retained counsel.'
The English practice was not adopted in this country. In their
constitutions or statutes, at least twelve of the thirteen colonies
rejected the common law rule. Instead they chose to recognize
the right to full representation by counsel, without regard to distinctions between questions of law and issues of fact, and-for
the most part-irrespective of the seriousness of the offense.
This conception of the right to counsel provided the background
against which the sixth amendment was proposed in 1789,
passed by both Houses of Congress almost without debate, and
ratified by the states in 1791. 9 The various debates on the provisions of the Bill of Rights shed no light on the significance or
meaning that Congress attributed to the right to counsel. 10
In the absence of illumination from this quarter, and given the
actual words and context of the sixth amendment right, it must
be assumed that the right to counsel clause was simply a restatement of the right already recognized by the individual states. As
such, the critical aspect of the sixth amendment right for present purposes-and the characteristic that distinguishes the
original understanding of this right from its contemporary interpretation-is that the right of the accused "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence" was considered a right to have
counsel for the purpose of assisting in presenting a defense at
trial." There is no reason to believe that the sixth amendment
8. See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-12, 24 (1955); L.
LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FirrH AMENDMENT 320-23 (1968); Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel at Police Interrogation,73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018-28 (1964);
see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60
(1932).
Throughout this period, the right to counsel in English procedure was almost exclu,sively a right to retained counsel. The right to appointed counsel was not established
until the enactment of a statute in 1695, but even then it applied only in treason cases.
See W. BEANEY, supra, at 9; Note, supra, at 1027.
9. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 61-65; Note, supra note 8, at 1030-31.
10. See W. BEANEY, supra note 8, at 23-24. Beaney accounts for the "atmosphere of
,silence" concerning the intentions that produced the right to counsel clause by referring
to the "logical assumption" that no great thought was given to the precise nature of the
federal right to counsel because of "a general understanding that the federal courts
would have jurisdiction of an insignificant number of criminal proceedings." Id. at 25.
11. Another distinction, not here material, is that the right was viewed as requiring
ionly an opportunity to be represented by retained-as opposed to appointed-counsel.
In the period preceding the adoption of the Constitution, only four states provided for
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was intended to create a right to have the aid of counsel at any
pretrial stage at which the defendant might find such assistance
useful, for there was no right to counsel under the common law
procedure of preliminary examinations, and nothing in the history of the Bill of Rights or the colonial enactments that preceded it suggests a purpose to extend the right beyond the trial
context."2 Rather, the contrary is suggested by the placement of
the right in the sixth amendment, which was formulated primarily as a compilation of guarantees designed to ensure the fairness
of criminal trials. 3
For nearly a century and a half after ratification of the sixth
amendment, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal
courts had much occasion to interpret the right to counsel provision, and the few cases on the subject raised issues that are not
germane here."'
II.

A.

CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT

PretrialAssistance Of Counsel Generally

During the past half century, Supreme Court decisions have
transformed the sixth amendment's "Assistance of Counsel"
clause from a simple guarantee of the aid of retained counsel at
trial into a requirement that counsel be available to protect the
defendant's interests in a variety of pretrial contexts. The decithe appointment of counsel, and in three of these such appointments were limited to
capital cases. The original federal statute relating to appointment of counsel, adopted in
1790, was also limited to capital cases. See W. BEANEY, supra note 8, at 16-18, 25, 28-29;
see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. at 466-71.
12. See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B.& C. 37, 107 Eng. Rep. 15 (1822) (no right to counsel at
preliminary examination); Note, supra note 8, at 1039-40 (no right to counsel at magistrate's hearing in England until 1848). None of the state provisions preceding the Bill of
Rights referred to a pretrial right to counsel, and a number of them clearly characterized
the right as a right to counsel at trial. The point is illustrated by the provisions of Virginia and New York, two of the three states whose ratification conventions proposed an
amendment to the Federal Constitution safeguarding the right to counsel. A Virginia
statute of 1786 allowed the accused to retain counsel to assist him at trial, and the New
York Constitution of 1777 stated that "in every trial . . . for crimes or misdemeanors,
the party . . . indicted shall be allowed counsel, as in civil practice." See W. BEANEY,
supra note 8, at 19-20. The provisions of the remaining states are surveyed in id. at 1822.
13. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) ("the core purpose of the
counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial"); L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE
FiFTm AMENDMENT?, 200 n.42 (1959); Note, supra note 8, at 1034.
14. See W. BEANEY, supra note 8, at 30-33 for a discussion of the decisions during this
period.
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sions have generally attempted to justify this metamorphosis on
the theory that representation by counsel during pretrial confrontations between the accused and his accusers is necessary to
ensure the fairness and integrity of the trial itself.
The development of the contemporary understanding of the
right to counsel can be traced to Powell v. Alabama,0 in which
the Supreme Court reversed the rape convictions of four defendants on the grounds that their rights to due process under the
fourteenth amendment had been violated by the trial court's
failure to provide them with appointed counsel until the morning of trial. Two aspects of this decision account for its influence
upon subsequent developments. The first is Justice Sutherland's
explanation of the reason for recognizing the right to the assistance of counsel at trial-the "guiding hand of counsel" is necessary then, he wrote, in order to guard against the conviction of a
defendant who is not guilty but who, because of his unfamiliarity with legal requirements and procedures, is unable adequately
to establish his innocence. 6 The second influential aspect of
Powell is its conclusion that effective assistance of counsel at
trial requires access to counsel during "critical" pretrial phases
of criminal proceedings.
In subsequent cases concerning the existence and scope of the
right to counsel, the Court has continued to assess the defendant's need for counsel, and to relate that need to the functions
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. See id. at 69:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
17. In its holding, the Court stated that the duty to assign counsel "is not discharged
by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." 287 U.S. at 71. Earlier in the
opinion, Justice Sutherland had observed that "during perhaps the most critical period
,of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their ar.raignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation, and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of
counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid as at the trial
itself." Id. at 57.
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that could be performed by counsel. For example, in decisions
establishing the right of indigent defendants under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to have counsel appointed for them in
federal and state criminal proceedings, the Court stressed "the
obvious truth" that representation by counsel places the defendant on an equal footing with the prosecution and, thereby,
1s
serves to assure a fair trial.
Similarly, in cases interpreting the "critical period" language
of Powell, the Court held that access to counsel is required at
preliminary judicial proceedings to help overcome the disadvantages an accused would otherwise suffer at trial.1
The same considerations have also informed the Court's decisions on the right to counsel in various nonjudicial pretrial contexts. Thus, the Court has recognized the need for- and, therefore, the right to have-counsel at a pretrial lineup to protect
the accused's right to a fair trial.2 On the other hand, the Court
has not recognized a constitutional right to counsel in pretrial
situations where the accused is not involved in complex legal
proceedings or confronted by witnesses or an expert adversary."1

18. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (explaining that the "noble
ideal" of equality before the law "cannot be realized if the poor person charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (contrasting the average defendant's "lack of professional legal
skill" with that of "experienced and learned counsel" for the prosecution).
19. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (plurality opinion) (an indigent accused is entitled to counsel at a preliminary hearing to protect against an erroneous or improper prosecution); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961) (counsel is
necessary at arraignment so that the accused knows all the defenses available to him and
can plead intelligently).
20. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-38 (1967) (assistance of counsel is
required to ensure that the lineup is not conducted in a manner that might affect the
accuracy of testimony at trial, and to permit effective confrontation of witnesses at trial).
21. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431-32 (1986) (no right to counsel during custodial interrogation prior to the initiation of formal judicial proceedings); United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-92 (1984) (no right to counsel prior to initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings against prisoners held in administrative segregation during a murder investigation); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317-21 (1973) (no right
to counsel at post-indictment photo identification); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90
(1972) (plurality opinion) (no right to counsel at pre-indictment "showup"); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (no right to counsel at the taking of handwriting
exemplars after indictment).
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B. The Massiah Line Of Cases
1. Spano v. New York
The immediate precursor of Massiah and its progeny was
Spano v. New York, 22 involving a coerced post-indictment confession. 28 The two concurring opinions of four Justices argued
that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause precluded
post-indictment interrogation of the defendant by the police in
the absence of counsel. The theory of these opinions was that
secret interrogation of a person formally accused of a crime is
inconsistent with an adversary system of justice, under which
such an accusation must be followed by arraignment and trial,
rather than "a kangaroo court procedure" by which the police
obtain a confession and thereby deprive the accused of effective
representation by counsel at the only stage when legal advice
and aid would help him. 4
2. Massiah v. United States
A majority of the Court adopted this premise in Massiah v.
United States,25 a case involving the admissibility of incriminating statements made by the defendant to one Colson, a codefendant, following their indictment and in the absence of counsel. Unbeknownst to Massiah, Colson-who had decided to
cooperate with the government in its continuing investigation of
the narcotics conspiracy charged in the indictment-had been
instructed by a federal agent to engage Massiah in conversation
concerning the charges against them and had permitted the installation of a radio transmitter in his car so that the agent
could overhear the conversation.
The Court conceded that the government had acted properly
in continuing to investigate the criminal activities of Massiah
and his confederates after he had been indicted."' However, a 622. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
23. The confession was extracted following an eight hour post-indictment interroga'tion during which the police rebuffed the defendant's repeated requests to see his attorney and, through false statements, induced him to believe that a childhood friend-who
had persuaded him to surrender-would lose his job with the police force if the defendant did not confess. 360 U.S. at 317-20.
24. Id. at 324-27.
25. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
26. Id. at 207.
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3 majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart (who

had authored one of the concurring opinions in Spano), held
that Massiah had been "denied the basic protections of [the
sixth amendment right to counsel] when there was used against
him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which
federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had
been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." ' Justice Stewart considered it unimportant that Massiah's incriminating
statements were made, not to the police during custodial interrogation, but to an undisclosed informant while Massiah was
free on bail. If a rule excluding statements obtained from an uncounseled defendant after indictment is to have any efficacy, he
wrote, "it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations
as well as those conducted in the jailhouse."' 5
. In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Clark and Harlan,
objected strongly that there was no sound basis for erecting "additional barriers to the pursuit of truth" by adopting a constitutional rule barring the use of the relevant, reliable, and highly
probative evidence at issue. To begin with, Justice White argued, there had been no unconstitutional interference with the
defendant's right to counsel, because Massiah had not been prevented from consulting with counsel as often as he wished, no
meetings with counsel had been disturbed or spied upon, and
there had been no obstruction of defense preparations for trial."
The Court's new rule, he continued, was merely "a thinly disguised constitutional policy" against the evidentiary use of voluntary admissions and confessions by the accused, a policy that
went far beyond the requirements of the privilege against selfincrimination. 0 That policy was both unwise and unnecessary,
he argued: unwise because it immunized statements made in furtherance of continuing illicit operations and relevant to guilt in a
pending prosecution; and unnecessary because a defendant in
27. Id. at 206. To support this conclusion, Justice Stewart referred to the views expressed in the concurring opinions in Spano which, he claimed, simply reflected the constitutional principle established in Powell v. Alabama that an indicted defendant is as
much entitled to the assistance of counsel before trial as at trial. Id. at 204-05.
28. Id. at 206 (quoting the dissenting opinion below). Justice Stewart added that
"Massiah was more seriously imposed upon . . .because he did not even know that he
was under interrogation by a government agent." Id.
29. Under these circumstances, Justice White concluded, "It is only a sterile syllogism-an unsound one, besides-to say that because Massiah had a right to counsel's aid
before and during the trial, his out-of-court conversations and admissions must be excluded if obtained without counsel's consent or presence." Id. at 209.
30. Id.
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Massiah's position was amply protected by the Court's voluntary
confession rules."1
3. Brewer v. Williams
2 occurred in Brewer
The first major application of Massiah3
v.
3
Williams." There, in another opinion by Justice Stewart, the
Court declared that the Massiah rule was not limited to surreptitious elicitation of incriminating statements outside the presence of counsel, but also covered conduct by known police officers that was "deliberately and designedly" intended to obtain
information from a defendant after the initiation of judicial proceedings and in the absence of counsel."4 "The clear rule of Massiah," Justice Stewart said, "is that once adversary proceedings
have been commenced against an individual, he has a right to
legal representation when the government interrogates him."3 5
Holding that the defendant had not waived that right, the Court
affirmed the lower court's reversal of the conviction." Four Justices dissented, principally because they believed that the defendant had waived his right to counsel, but also on the grounds
that the conduct of the police did not imperil the core values
that the sixth amendment was intended to protect-the fairness
of trials and the integrity of the truth-finding process-and,

31. Id. at 213. Justice White also argued that application of the exclusionary sanction
was particularly inappropriate because the situation involved no suggestion or possibility
of coercion, and because Massiah's statements would have been admissible if there had
been no prior arrangements between Colson and the police, even though the hazard to
Massiah-the defection of a confederate in crime-would have been precisely the same.
Id. at 211.
32. Massiah's requirements were first applied to the states in McLeod v. Ohio, 321
U.S. 356 (1965), in which the Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed a state court
murder conviction obtained nearly four years before Massiah on the basis of a postindictment, pre-arraignment confession made while the defendant was voluntarily assisting the police in locating the murder weapon but before he had sought or obtained the
assistance of counsel.
33. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The essential facts of Williams were that, following the defendant's arraignment on an arrest warrant charging abduction and after he had consulted with two attorneys who advised him not to make any statements to the police and
who secured an agreement from the police that they would not question him, the defend.ant made incriminating statements and led the police to the victim's body following a
statement to him by one of the officers in the absence of counsel that the victim's par.ents were entitled to "a Christian burial" for their daughter. Id. at 390-93.
34. Id. at 399-401.
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id. at 401-06.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:3 & 4

therefore, did not merit the sanction of suppression of relevant
37
and reliable evidence.
4.

United States v. Henry

Next, in United States v. Henry,3 8 the Court declined the government's invitation to reconsider Massiah. Instead, the Court
applied Massiah's prohibition to require the exclusion of incriminating post-indictment statements made in the absence of
counsel by an incarcerated defendant to a fellow prisoner who
was acting as a paid informant for the government. The Chief
Justice's opinion for the Court pointed out that, although the
informant had been instructed not to question Henry about the
pending charges, the informant was not a passive listener;
rather, he had "some conversation" with Henry, and Henry's incriminating statements were "the product of this conversation."39 For this and other reasons, 0 the Court concluded that
the government had "intentionally [created] a situation likely to
induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel," and, in so doing, had violated his sixth
amendment right to counsel. " ' However, the opinion contrasted
the use of an inanimate electronic "listening post," which has no
capacity to influence the subject matter or substance of a conversation, and expressly reserved the question of using an informant who makes no effort to stimulate conversation about
the crime charged.' 2
37. Id. at 415-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 429-38 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at 438-41 (Blackmun, J., joined by White and
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
38. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
39. Id. at 271.
40. The Chief Justice also stressed the facts that the informant was to be paid only if
he produced useful information, that he was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of
Henry, and that Henry was in custody at the time. Id. at 270.
41. Id. at 274.
42. Id. at 271 & n.9; see also id. at 276-77 (Justice Powell, concurring on the express
understanding that such methods were not prohibited by the Court's opinion). The question left open in Henry was resolved in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), a
habeas case in which the defendant challenged the admission of incriminating statements he made to a cellmate after being charged with murder. The cellmate, who was
cooperating with the police and who had been instructed only to "listen to what the
defendant might say about the identities of his accomplices," asked the defendant no
questions and merely listened to his spontaneous and unsolicited statements. On these
facts, a 6-3 majority of the Court rejected the Massiah argument because the defendant
failed to show that "the police and their informant took some action, beyond mere listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." Id. at 459.
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Justices Blackmun (joined by Justice White) and Rehnquist
filed dissenting opinions. The former contended that the majority had unwisely abandoned Massiah's "deliberately elicited"
test which, he claimed, had been designed to impose the exclusionary sanction on "conduct that is most culpable, most likely
to frustrate the purpose of having counsel, and most susceptible
to being checked by a deterrent.

48

The latter argued forcefully

and at length that Massiah should be reconsidered and that
there was no justification for applying the exclusionary rule in
such cases.4
5. Maine v. Moulton
The most recent application of the Massiah doctrine occurred
in Maine v. Moulton."" In several respects, the facts in Moulton
were quite similar to those in Massiah.4 ' However, in Moulton it
was the defendant who arranged the encounter at which he
made incriminating statements, and in Moulton the police were
using the cooperating codefendant to investigate a new
crime-threats by the defendant against a potential witness for
the state-rather than to obtain additional evidence concerning
the crime for which the defendant had already been indicted.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court rejected these distinctions as irrelevant. First, he said after reviewing the Court's earlier right to counsel cases with particular emphasis on Spano,
Massiah, and Henry, the sixth amendment guarantees a person
who has been formally charged with an offense the right to rely
on counsel as a "medium" between him and the state, and imposes on the state an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents the protection accorded by this right.'
43. 447 U.S. at 277-82 & n.6.
44. Id. at 290-302.
45. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
46. Having been indicted for theft, Moulton retained counsel and was released on
bail. Thereafter, he made incriminating statements to his codefendant Colson (no relation to Massiah's codefendant of the same name), who was secretly cooperating with the
police, which were recorded and used against him at trial. See id. at 161-68.
47. Id. at 168-76. With reference to this obligation, Justice Brennan added:
[K]nowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused
without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not
to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation
of such an opportunity. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment is violated when the
State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and
a state agent.
Id. at 176.
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Here, he pointed out, the police knew that Moulton and Colson
were meeting to discuss the pending charges and to plan their
defense; they knew, therefore, that Moulton would make statements that he had a constitutional right not to make to their
agent prior to consulting with counsel. By concealing the fact
that Colson was their agent, the police denied Moulton the opportunity to consult with counsel and thus deprived him of the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 8
Second, said Justice Brennan, the argument that the defendant's statements should not be suppressed because the police
had other, legitimate reasons for listening to his conversation
with Colson was no more persuasive than the similar contention
in Massiah. Permitting the use of evidence obtained in violation
of the accused's sixth amendment rights whenever the police asserted an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance
would, he said, invite "abuse by law enforcement personnel in
the form of fabricated investigations" and risk "evisceration of
the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah."

On the

other hand, he conceded, as had the Court in Massiah, that
"[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to
which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of
course, admissible at a trial of those offenses."50
The Chief Justice dissented. In his view, Massiah's prohibition is limited to the deliberate elicitation of statements for use
against the defendant in connection with the trial of charges
with respect to which the right to counsel has already attached.
Therefore, he argued, if alternative, legitimate reasons motivated the surveillance, no sixth amendment violation occurred.5 1
Moreover, he contended, application of the exclusionary rule in
this situation could not be justified on grounds of deterrence;
because the police obtained the incriminating evidence in the
course of attempting to thwart a potentially lethal obstruction of
justice, rather than in an effort to strengthen the existing case
against the defendant, there was no police "misconduct" to
deter."
48. Id. at 176-77.
49. Id. at 180.
50. Id. at 180 n.16.
51. Id. at 184-90 (Justices White and Rehnquist joined in this portion of the
dissent.).
52. Id. at 190-92 (Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined in this portion of
the dissent.).
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Summary Of Current Law

The cases reviewed above demonstrate that the Court currently views the sixth amendment right to counsel as serving two
functions. On the one hand, in its traditional role, it serves to
protect the accused's right to a fair trial and to safeguard the
integrity of the truth-finding process by enabling the accused to
cope with the intricacies of the law and to face his expert adversary on equal terms.5 3 Thus, the accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel not only at trial, but also during earlier postcharge proceedings and confrontations with the government that
are "critical" in the sense that, if conducted in the absence of
counsel, their result might unfairly prejudice the accused's defense at trial."
On the other hand, as interpreted in the Massiah line of cases,
the sixth amendment also prohibits a person from being questioned-overtly or covertly-by government agents in the absence of counsel concerning an offense that has led to his indictment.5 5 By requiring the suppression of incriminating evidence
so obtained, this interpretation insulates the accused from the
consequences of uncounseled but voluntary statements whether
or not their admission would impair the fairness of the trial or
the integrity of the truth-finding process.
However, the "magic cloak" provided by the sixth amendment5 6 does not provide complete protection for a person who
has been indicted or otherwise charged with a crime. It is clear,
for example, that the authorities may continue to investigate a
person following his indictment. 57 If through the use of an electronic "listening post" or a passive informant, they obtain incriminating statements concerning pending charges "by luck or
happenstance," that evidence is admissible at the trial of those
53. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
54. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
55. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964). As used above and in the remainder of this Report, the term "indictment" and
variants thereof includes other methods by which a person is formally charged with a
crime, such as arraignment following arrest and the filing of an information.
56. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 186 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 178-80; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 206-07.
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charges." Furthermore, if the government surreptitiously obtains evidence of the defendant's involvement in a crime other
than that with which he has already been charged,
it may use
59
that evidence to convict him of the other crime.

III. CRITIQUE OF CURRENT LAW
The Massiah doctrine, and its enforcement by means of an
automatic exclusionary rule, are vulnerable to criticism on a
number of grounds, none of which, in our judgment, has ever
been addressed adequately by the Court.
A.

Objections To The Massiah Doctrine

The Court has never explained satisfactorily its conclusion
that the sixth amendment right to counsel is violated when the
government obtains incriminating statements from an indicted
defendant in a noncoercive atmosphere outside the presence of
counsel. Indeed, such an explanation would be difficult, because
Massiah'sview of the right to counsel has no support in history,
logic, or considerations of sound policy.
1. Lack of Historical Support
The most obvious flaw in the Massiah doctrine is its lack of
historical basis. Neither the common law view of the right to
counsel, nor the modified version of that right adopted in the
American colonies, nor the apparent understanding of the right
on the part of those who proposed and ratified the sixth amendment provides any basis for the rule. As discussed earlier," the
right to counsel adopted in the sixth amendment merely echoed
the right as recognized by the states, and that right, in turn, was
no more than a guarantee of the assistance of retained counsel
at trial. The Founders simply did not contemplate a right to
58. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at
176; United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9; id. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring).
59. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179-80, 180 n.16; United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. at 272; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 308 (1966).
60. See supra Part I.
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counsel prior to trial, perhaps because they saw no need for such

a right."
2. Lack of Logical Support
Subsequent developments in investigative and prosecutorial
practices in the United States convinced the Supreme Court of
the need to extend the sixth amendment right to counsel to certain pretrial contexts. However, the logic of the decisions expanding the scope of the sixth amendment right does not support, much less compel, the results reached in Massiah and its
progeny. Those decisions establish that recognition of the right
to counsel in a particular situation depends on the need to provide the assistance of counsel in that context to protect the values that the sixth amendment is designed to safeguard."' As the
cases make clear, the core purpose of the sixth amendment is to
ensure the fairness of trials by equalizing the strength of the adversaries and by protecting the integrity of the truth-finding
process." The traditional role of an attorney in achieving these
goals is to prepare the accused's defense" and to act as his advocate in encounters with the government at which the case is advanced toward disposition or at which the reliability of the
truth-finding process might be unfairly undermined."
Neither the core purposes of the sixth amendment nor the
traditional functions of counsel in contributing to the realization
of those purposes are implicated when a government investigator
attempts surreptitiously to obtain incriminating statements
from an indicted defendant. In this situation, the accused is not
confronted with complex legal procedures or by an expert adver61. The focus on the trial as the point at which the assistance of counsel should be
available to the accused has been explained on the ground that it was not until then that
the accused was confronted with the full adversary force of the state. See United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); Note, supra note 8, at 1040-41, 1045.
62. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973) ("The Court consistently has
applied a historical interpretation of the guarantee, and has expanded the constitutional
right to counsel only when new contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave
birth initially to the right itself").
63. See, e.g., id. at 311-13; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
64. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 58.
65. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MnN. L Rav. 47, 49-50 (1964); Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need
,to Reconsider the ConstitutionalPremises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 A.
CanM. L. Ray. 1, 9-10 & n.59 (1979).
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sary, nor is there any interference with his right to consult freely

with counsel or otherwise to prepare his defense." There is,
therefore, no reason to believe that the absence of counsel at
this point will result in unfairness to the defendant at trial, either by rendering him less able to deal with the intricacies of the
law and the advocacy of an*expert opponent, or by subjecting
him to the risk of conviction on the basis of unreliable evidence.

It has been suggested, nevertheless, that recognition of the
right to counsel in this situation is justified because an attorney
could advise the defendant on "the benefits of the Fifth Amendment" and protect him from "the overreaching of the prosecution. ' 67 Neither rationale can withstand analysis. While it is

true-indeed, likely-that counsel will protect a defendant
against self-incrimination by advising him to say nothing,"
counsel's presence would not protect the accused from compulsory self-incrimination, which is what the fifth amendment prohibits. This is so because there is no element of compulsion-let
alone compulsion by the government-when a person not in custody chooses to confide in someone whom he does not believe to
be a government agent.6
The suggestion that "overreaching" occurs when an informant
is used to question an indicted defendant in the absence of
counsel seems to proceed from a jaundiced view of the propriety
of employing certain investigative techniques at the post-accusation stage, rather than from a concern for the right to counsel as
such. 0 Yet, in other contexts, the Court has fully approved the
use of undercover methods to solve crimes 7 1 and it is not appar66. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 293-94 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 209 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
67. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973).
68. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) ("[Under our adversary system of
justice) any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to the police under any circumstances.") (Jackson, J., concurring).
69. See Grano, supra note 65, at 21 n.134; Kamisar, Brewer v, Williams, Massiah,
and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"?When Does It Matter?, 67 Gao. L.J. 59, 63
(1980); see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 297 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 211 (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, even if a
Massiah-like situation could be regarded as involving coercion, there would be no need
to extend the scope of the sixth amendment, since the fifth amendment's self-incrimination and due process clauses would provide protection enough against compelled incrimination. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 295-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 209-10 (White, J., dissenting).
70. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 212 (White, J., dissenting); Enker &
Elsen, supra note 65, at 57, 80-82.
71. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557-58 (1977); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality
opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 308 (1966).

SPRING

AND SUMMER

1989]

Massiah Right to Counsel

ent why investigative activities that are entirely lawful prior to
the commencement of formal proceedings should become entirely unlawful thereafter, so long as they do not impair the accused's opportunities to prepare his defense and his right to fair
treatment at trial.
One suggested explanation for such a distinction is that the
filing of formal charges shifts proceedings from an investigatory
to an accusatory stage.y This explanation, however, merely begs
the question. There is no logical reason why the initiation of formal charges should entitle the accused to greater protection
against the use of noncoercive investigative techniques than
before. The protection of counsel is warranted only if the altered
nature of the situation faced by the accused subjects him to a
danger that he did not face earlier, and if that is a danger
against which the sixth amendment right to counsel is intended
to safeguard him. Neither of these conditions is met in the situation under consideration. The risk caused by the making of incriminating statements is a greater likelihood of conviction at
trial. That risk is just as great when the statements are made
before indictment as when they are made after the accused has
been formally charged. Moreover, the greater danger of conviction results not from the defendant's inability to cope with the
.intricacies of the law or to withstand the superior advocacy of an
expert prosecutor, but rather from his inability to keep quiet
and his misplaced trust in a fellow criminal. This is simply not
"unfairness" of the kind with which the sixth amendment right
73
to counsel is concerned.
Finally, it has been argued, in effect, that the Massiah doctrine is a logical corollary to the sixth amendment because it
prevents unfairness resulting from the use of deception to prevent a defendant whose right to the assistance of counsel has
attached from recognizing his possible need to avail himself of
72. See Grano, supra note 65, at 18-25. The Court has consistently taken the position
that the commencement of formal proceedings marks the point at which an accused is
constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 431-32 (1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88 (1984); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). The
stated rationale for this view is that it is only after the initiation of formal charges that
the accused is faced with the awesome power of a government that has committed itself
to securing his conviction, and only then that he confronts difficulties that he could not
.cope with adequately without the help of an attorney. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475
'U.S. at 430; Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); United States v. Gouveia, 467
U.S. at 188-89.
73. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 281 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
id. at 294, 297-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 211
(White, J., dissenting).
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that right.7 4 But this argument also begs the question-by assuming that a person who has been formally charged has a right
not to have the government attempt to obtain incriminating information from him except with the consent, or in the presence,
of his attorney. Unless such a right exists, there is no "unfairness" in the use of investigative techniques that impair its
exercise.
The major historical and rational objections to the recognition
of such a right have already been mentioned. An additional argument is that its recognition is logically inconsistent with the
apparent acceptability of using an electronic listening post or a
passive informant to obtain incriminating statements concerning
a charged offense. The use of such "passive" techniques after
indictment also involves government action that circumvents the
right to counsel-assuming that it exists-and exposes the defendant to the same danger as if he were actively questioned by
75
a person he did not realize was a government agent.
3. Lack of Policy Support
The Massiah doctrine's lack of support in the history or logic
of the sixth amendment suggests that it is merely a cover for a
judicially-imposed policy against the use of post-indictment confessions. 76 However, the requirement that counsel be available at
all times after indictment to act as a "medium" between the accused and the government77 or as "a sort of a guru" to prevent
ill-advised statements by the accused 78 is unsound as a matter of
policy for several reasons.
First, preventing the use after indictment of investigative
techniques that are perfectly proper before indictment forecloses
74. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177 ("By concealing the fact that Colson was
an agent of the State, the police denied Moulton the opportunity to consult with counsel
and thus denied him the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.").
75. The argument in favor of such a right is also undercut by the acceptability of
surreptitious interrogation of an indicted defendant during an investigation of additional
crimes. In that situation, incriminating statements concerning the new crime are admissible at the defendant's trial for that offense even though they may have been obtained
during a confrontation that violated his right to counsel in connection with an earlier
charge.
76. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 210 (White, J., dissenting) ("[The Massiah rule] is nothing more than a thinly disguised constitutional policy of minimizing or
entirely prohibiting the use in evidence of voluntary out-of-court admissions and confessions made by the accused.").
77. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.
78. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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efforts that may be necessary to obtain evidence to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. In some
cases it is true that formal proceedings are initiated only after
exhaustive police investigations and grand jury proceedings. In
other cases, however, a person may be arrested on the basis of
probable cause in the immediate aftermath of an offense and
during an early stage of the investigation, before there has been
an opportunity to establish clearly his connection with the
crime. Once arrested, such a person must be arraigned promptly.
By precluding the use of a fruitful investigative technique after
the accused has been charged, the Massiah doctrine causes the
loss of confessions and incriminating statements that are never
obtained because the police do not question the defendant, and
this loss may prevent the accumulation of evidence sufficient to
sustain the government's burden of proof at trial.79
A second and related policy objection is that Massiah's prohibition may cause authorities to delay initiating formal charges
against some persons in order to complete their investigations,
even though they have sufficient evidence to arrest or indict the
suspect. Presumably, such forbearance would not be exercised in
cases of suspects known to be dangerous, but in other cases it
might seem a reasonable course despite the potential-and, in
some instances, actual-harm that would be caused to the public
by leaving the suspect at large. Third, by requiring that postindictment statements be made in the presence of or with the
consent of an attorney, the Massiah doctrine strongly discourages the making of admissions of guilt, no matter how voluntary.
The Court has repeatedly recognized society's strong interest in
securing this kind of evidence in order to facilitate the swift and
effective operation of the criminal justice system, 0 yet Massiah's requirement is virtually certain to ensure the making of
no statements at all. 8 1
Fourth, the policy considerations underlyitig t .e ethical rule
against communication by an attorney with an opposing party
79. Apart from penalizing society unfairly, application of the Massiah doctrine in
such cases may also be harmful to some defendants, either because they will be subjected
to trial on the basis of marginal evidence of guilt, or because further investigation would
have exonerated them or at least persuaded the prosecutor not to bring them to trial.
80. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) ("Admissions of guilt are more
than merely 'desirable,' [citing United States v. Washington]; they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting and punishing those who violate the
law"); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) ("Indeed, far from being
prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are
inherently desirable.").
81. Cf. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (opinion of Jackson, J.).
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who is represented by counsel"2 do not apply in a Massiah-type
situation. 8 As Justice White observed in his dissent in Massiah,
that rule deals with the conduct of lawyers, not investigators.
"Lawyers," he pointed out, "are forbidden to interview the opposing party because of the supposed imbalance of legal skill
and acumen between the lawyer and the party litigant."8 4 Thus,
the reason for the rule does not apply to the conduct of
nonlawyers, and certainly not to communications with a defendant by a codefendant, as in Massiah and Moulton, or by a fellow
criminal, as in Henry.
Finally, in assessing the wisdom of the Massiah doctrine, it is
worth noting that England-the common law jurisdiction most
closely akin to our own-does not appear to countenance such
an impediment to the search for truth in criminal cases. Under
the English "Judges' Rules," although post-charge questioning is
discouraged, the police are explicitly permitted to question a
person in the absence of counsel after he has been charged, if
such interrogation is "necessary for the purpose of preventing or
minimizing harm or loss to some other person or the public."
Moreover, the use of trickery to obtain a confession or incriminating statements is also permitted, so long as "unfair" tactics
are not employed. The critical question in determining the admissibility of any such evidence is whether it was provided voluntarily.8 That should be the decisive factor in this country as
well.

82. Rule 4.2 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), which is substantially similar to former Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1), provides: "In representing a client,
a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
83. The Court's only suggestion that the Rule is in any way implicated in such a
situation is a cryptic reference to DR 7-104(A)(1) in a footnote to the statement in
Henry that Henry was a case "where the 'constable' planned an impermissible interference with the right to the assistance of counsel." United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,
275 (1980). The footnote simply "note[d]" the provisions of the Rule, while acknowledging that it did not "bear upon the constitutional question in this case." Id. at 275 n.14.
84.

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1964).

85. See Kaci, Confessions: A Comparison of Exclusion Under Miranda in the United
States and Under the Judges' Rules in England, 10 AM. J. CiuM. L. 87, 109-12 (1982)
(reproducing the text of the Judges' Rules); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79
HARv. L. REV. 935, 1094 (1966).
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Objections To Application Of An Exclusionary Rule

Even assuming that the sixth amendment may properly be interpreted to forbid the government from confronting an indicted
defendant without counsel being present, there remains the
question whether a violation of this prohibition requires application of an exclusionary rule that withholds reliable and probative evidence from the factfinder at trial. The Court has applied
an automatic rule of suppression in these cases, but has never
explained why that remedy is either necessary or appropriate.
Two issues must be addressed in this connection: whether exclusion is a constitutional requirement, and-if it is not-whether
it is justified by policy considerations.
1. Exclusion Is Not Constitutionally Required
The language of the Court's holding in Massiah indicates that
the defendant's right to counsel was violated when his uncounseled post-indictment statements were used against him at
trial," not when the statements were elicited from him. On its
face, that suggests that Massiah's exclusionary rule may be constitutionally required. However, a convincing argument can be
made that this view is incorrect-that the constitutional violation occurs (if at all) when the government circumvents an indicted defendant's right to the assistance of counsel, and that
exclusion of the fruits of such a violation is merely a prophylactic device to deter unlawful police conduct.
In the first place, Massiah's description of the point at which
the right to counsel was violated-at trial-makes no sense.
Nothing in the Court's opinion or in the opinion of the court
below suggested any sort of interference with the defendant's
free exercise of his right to the assistance of counsel at trial. The
86. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 206 ("We hold that the petitioner was
denied the basic protections of [the sixth amendment right to counsel] when there was
used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal
agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence
of his counsel."); id. at 207 ("All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating
statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not
constitutionally be used by the prosecution against him at his trial."). Even the dissenters in Massiah seem to have shared the view that the purported constitutional violation
occurred when the evidence was introduced at trial. See id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting)
(describing the majority opinion as creating "a constitutional rule. . . barring the use of

evidence").
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entire focus of both courts was on the propriety of the government's conduct prior to trial. Moreover, the suggestion that the
constitutional violation occurred at trial implies that there was
nothing improper in the government's earlier deliberate elicita-

tion of incriminating statements from him in the absence of
counsel. Yet, if that were so, there would be no basis for suppressing the statements at trial. In short, despite the confusing

language of its holding, it seems clear that what the Court found
offensive was the government's post-indictment investigative
conduct, not its conduct at trial.8
Second, subsequent decisions make it clear that what violates
the sixth amendment in the Massiah sense is the use of evidence-gathering methods that frustrate an indicted defendant's
right to the assistance of counsel. Thus, in Brewer v. Williams,s
the Court stated: "[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have been commenced against an individual,
he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him." The point was made even more explicitly in the
holding in United States v. Henry:8 9 "By intentionally creating
a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's sixth amendment right to counsel." 90 Thus, the
constitutional violation involved in a Massiah-type situation
consists of post-indictment efforts by the government to secure
87. One explanation for the curious language of the holding in Massiah may be the
Warren Court's penchant for viewing remedies as well as rights in constitutional terms.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79, 490-91 (1966) (holding that the fifth
amendment is violated by noncompliance with prescribed rules for custodial interrogations, though equally effective alternative rules would be acceptable); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (describing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule as "constitutionally necessary"). Later decisions have eschewed this expansive approach. See, e.g.,
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (describing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule as "a judicially-created remedy .. .rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved"); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-46
(1974) (holding that failure to comply with Miranda's requirements did not violate the
fifth amendment). See generally REPORT No. 1,supra note 6, Part I.C.1; REPORT No. 2,
supra note 6, Parts I.G.-J.
88. 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).
89. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
90. Id. at 274; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) ("[Tlhe primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory
techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation"); Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159, 172 (1985) (explaining that the ground for reversal in Massiah was that
"the incriminating statements were obtained in violation of Messiah's rights under the
Sixth Amendment." (emphasis supplied)); id. at 176 ("[Tihe Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the
accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a
state agent.").
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incriminating statements from the defendant in the absence of
counsel, not of using the statements so obtained at his trial. It
follows, accordingly, that the rule excluding statements obtained
by means of a sixth amendment violation has no independent
constitutional basis; as is true in the fourth and fifth amendment contexts, it is merely a judicially-created device for enforcing a constitutional right. 1
2. Exclusion Is Not Justified on Policy Grounds
As in the fourth and fifth amendment contexts," a balancing
approach should be employed to determine whether suppression
of evidence is the appropriate response to a violation of the
Massiah right to counsel.' 3 Application of such a test demonstrates that exclusion is unjustified. First, the costs of exclusion
are unquestionably substantial.'4 The most obvious and serious
costs are the impairment of the truth-finding process that results from suppression of reliable and probative evidence of
guilt, the consequent release or lenient treatment of obviously
guilty defendants, and the generation of public disrespect for a
system that shields a defendant from the consequences of incriminating statements made voluntarily to confederates in
crime. 95
Second, suppression produces "precious little in the way of
offsetting 'benefits,' "' other than to reward defendants with
windfalls that are wildly disproportionate to the gravity of the
constitutional violations involved. Measured in terms of deter91. Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 443-46 (1974).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-13 (1984) (fourth amendment);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450 (fifth amendment).
93. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-27 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf. Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 442-48 (1984) (the use of a balancing process is appropriate in determining
whether evidence obtained in violation of the accused's right to counsel should be admitted under an "inevitable discovery" exception to exclusionary rule).
94. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 415-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at
208 (White, J., dissenting).
95. These costs are taken more seriously in other democracies, including England and
Canada, which generally permit the use of confessions and incriminating statements obtained in violation of limitations on police interrogation practices if the evidence is found
to have been given voluntarily. See REPoiR No. 1, supra note 6, Part III.
96. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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rence of unlawful police conduct,97 the gain to society is insub-

stantial, if it exists at all. In most cases, it is difficult to conclude
that the police were guilty of any misconduct, let alone transgressions so egregious as to warrant application of a deterrent

sanction. 98 Certainly, that is true in cases such as Massiah and
Moulton, where the police were merely conducting permissible
investigations of continuing or new offenses in which they rea-

sonably believed the indicted defendant was involved."
Contrary to the Court's contention in Moulton, 0 0
evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's right
whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate
their surveillance would not invite law enforcement

admitting
to counsel
reason for
abuses in

the form of fabricated investigations. The Court cited no evidence to support a belief that law enforcement officers would
deliberately violate the Constitution by fabricating investigations for the purpose of evading defendants' rights to counsel,
much less that they would do so commonly. Indeed, precisely
the opposite conclusion seems warranted. The officers in Henry
and Moulton took pains to prevent their informants from engag-

ing in conduct that might violate the defendant's right to coun-

sel as that right was then understood. 0 1 Moreover, as a general
97. Deterrence is the appropriate measure of benefit in the fourth amendment context since the primary, if not the sole, purpose of excluding evidence obtained through
unreasonable searches and seizures is to deter such unlawful police conduct. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974). No reason appears why the same test should not be applied in the sixth amendment right to counsel context, where the object is also to prevent unconstitutional police
conduct, as opposed to curing a wrong that has already been suffered. See Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
98. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 281 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 297 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 420-27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 209-11 (White, J., dissenting).
99. As the Chief Justice observed in his dissent in Moulton: "In fact, if anything,
actions by the police of the type involved here should be encouraged. The diligent investigation of the police in this case may have saved the lives of several potential witnesses
and certainly led to the prosecution and conviction of respondent for additional serious
crimes." 474 U.S. at 192.
100. 474 U.S. at 180.
101. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 165 (the informant was told not to attempt to
question the defendant); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 268 (the informant was
instructed not to initiate conversation with the defendant about the pending charges or
to question him about them); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 439 (1986) (the
informant was instructed not to ask any questions, but simply to keep his ears open for
the names of the defendant's accomplices). Even in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 39193, which involved a direct confrontation between the police and the accused, the police
demonstrated their sensitivity to the right to counsel, and to counsel's request that they
not question the accused in his absence, by not subjecting the accused to "interrogation"
in the commonly understood sense of that term.
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matter, federal and state law enforcement officers are instructed
in the requirements of the sixth amendment and may be subjected to disciplinary sanctions for deliberate violations of the
right to counsel. 10 2 These deterrents to unlawful conduct are reinforced by the threat of civil actions for damages under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,10 8 or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In any event, the risk that appears to trouble the Court could
be averted simply by limiting application of the exclusionary
rule to cases in which the police did not act in good faith. For
example, as a precondition to the admissibility of the evidence,
the police could be required to justify the continuing or new investigation that produced it by showing that they had reasonable suspicion-or, perhaps, even probable cause to believe-that
the defendant was involved in a continuing offense or was embarked on additional criminal activity.
In short, because these are typically situations in which the
police act in good faith, there is no more benefit to be derived
from excluding the evidence they obtain than would be realized
by suppressing the fruits of a good faith violation of the fourth
amendment. 101
A final argument against application of an exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained through Massiah violations is that- just as
in the fourth amendment context-there are available equally
effective but less costly methods of achieving deterrence and redress.10 5 For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation instructs its agents-as well as state and local police officers who
attend its training sessions-on the requirements of Massiah,
and has developed administrative guidelines, which are backed
up by disciplinary sanctions for noncompliance, to govern the
conduct of post-indictment efforts to obtain inculpatory material from defendants.'"e In addition, redress for a violation of a
defendant's right to the assistance of counsel can already be
102. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
103. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
104. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-22 (1984) (adopting a limited "good
faith" exception to the search and seizure exclusionary rule on the basis of the conclusion that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant
cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion").
105. Cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule need not be applied in civil deportation proceedings in
part because of the existence of administrative measures adopted by the INS to prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures by its agents).
106. See FBI LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR SpzciL.L AGENTS, § 7; FBI MANUAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES, § 13.
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sought in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when state or
local police are involved,107 and Bivens provides a comparable
remedy in cases involving federal agents. A combination of these
approaches would supply a more direct incentive to respect an
accused's right to counsel, but would not entail the excessive
costs of the current exclusionary rule approach.
IV.

POTENTIAL REFORMS AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES

Because the Massiah doctrine comes into play only after a defendant has been indicted, it has not had the far reaching effects-or consequences as harmful-as the limitations on police
interrogation adopted in Miranda, which constitute far more serious impediments to the search for truth in criminal investigations and trials. Nevertheless, the doctrine is irrational and detrimental to effective law enforcement, as well as subversive of
the truth-finding process. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that
a successful attack on Massiah would not impair the value of
the right to counsel at trial or during "critical" pretrial confrontations at which the assistance of an attorney serves the purposes of the sixth amendment. For these reasons, the possibility
of eliminating the doctrine, or at least reducing its scope, deserves serious consideration. These goals could be sought either
by a direct attack on the Massiah right not to be questioned, or
by striking at Massiah's exclusionary rule enforcement mechanism. Given the Court's recent reaffirmations of the understanding of the constitutional right to counsel expressed in Massiah,
the latter strategy seems more immediately promising.
A.

Elimination Or Limitation Of The Massiah Right Not To
Be Questioned

Unlike the more notorious Mapp and Miranda decisions,
which established what are now understood to be merely remedial or prophylactic measures aimed at protecting fourth and
fifth amendment rights, respectively, Massiah created a new
"constitutional" right-the right not be questioned by government agents after indictment except in the presence or with the
107. Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (§ 1983 suit brought against an
undercover agent on the theory that the agent violated the defendant's right to counsel
by attending meetings held by defendant and his attorney to prepare for trial).

SPRING AND SUMMER 1989]

Massiah Right to Counsel

consent of counsel. Because this right has been couched in constitutional terms, efforts to abrogate or modify it must be addressed to the Supreme Court.
The principal arguments that can be made against Massiah's
novel expansion of the sixth amendment right to counsel-as
discussed in Part III above-are that the Massiah rule is historically unsound, is unnecessary to serve the fundamental purposes
of the sixth amendment right, and is unwise as a matter of policy. The presence of counsel during post-indictment questioning
affects neither the fairness of the process by which the defendant's guilt or innocence is determined at trial, nor the reliability
of the evidence used to arrive at that determination; the fifth
amendment provides adequate. protection for the legitimate interests of defendants from whom the government seeks incriminating statements after indictment.108 The Massiah rule represents unwise policy because it precludes the use of otherwise
legitimate and useful investigative techniques, because it may
endanger the public by causing delays in arrests or indictments,
and because it impairs the administration of justice by inhibiting the making of voluntary admissions of guilt.
Two alternative arguments might provide the Court with an
attractive middle ground between complete repudiation of Massiah and continued adherence to its irrational view of the right
to counsel: (1) limiting Massiah to custodial situations' 9 or
other settings in which the indicted person may be considered
particularly vulnerable, as when he has not actually consulted
with counsel, for example; and (2) arguing that no sixth amendment violation occurs when the police surreptitiously confront
an indicted defendant during a bona fide investigation of his
participation in a separate offense, because in that situation the
state is not seeking to elicit information concerning a charge
with respect to which the defendant's right to counsel has
attached."10
108. The self-incrimination clause guards against subtle as well as blatant forms of
coercion, and the due process clause prevents the use of other "unconscionable" techniques. Cf. Lyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (defendant denied due process when convicted of murder on the basis of a confession extracted in the absence of co".,l by a
highly skilled psychiatrist who the police had falsely led defendant to believe could provide him with medical relief from an acutely painful sinus attack).
109. Cf. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273-74 (1980) ("[T]he mere fact of
custody imposes pressure on the accused; confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government
agents.").
110. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 181-92 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The Court has not yet been asked to decide a case in which an indicted defendant, who
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Despite their apparent validity, however, neither the primary
nor the alternative arguments appear likely to succeed at this
time. The Court declined the government's invitation in Henry
to reconsider Massiah's view of the right to counsel, and it recently reaffirmed that view in Moulton, in an opinion that expressly rejected the separate investigation argument made in the
Department's amicus brief.1 1' Moreover, the only members of
the current Court who appear to favor overruling Massiah completely are Justices White and Rehnquist,"' and they-together
with the departing Chief Justice-seem to be the only ones willing to restrict Massiah's right to counsel to cases in which the
police attempt to obtain evidence concerning an offense for
which the defendant has already been charged. Thus, seeking reconsideration of these points is not likely to be fruitful at
present.
B.

Elimination Or Modification Of The Massiah
Exclusionary Rule

An approach that holds greater promise for more immediate
success would be to argue that the exclusionary rule should not
be applied to evidence obtained by means of a Massiah violation
or, alternatively, that the evidence should be suppressed only
when the police have not acted in good faith. Such an argument
could be made either to the Court or to Congress, since the exclusionary rule aspect of Massiah is not constitutionally
required.""
Two points could be made to support an argument that the
Massiah exclusionary rule should be abandoned entirely. The
first is the familiar contention that a weighing of the costs and
benefits of exclusion requires complete abrogation of the supreswas being surreptitiously questioned about a separate crime, unexpectedly divulged incriminating information concerning the offense with which he had already been charged.
111. More recently, in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which applied Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), to prohibit post-arraignment questioning of a person who had requested the appointment of counsel, the Court stated: "[AIfter a formal
accusation has been made-and a person who had previously been just a 'suspect' has
become an 'accused' within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment-the constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer
employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might
have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of their investigation." Id. at 632.
112. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. at 209 (White, J., dissenting).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
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sion sanction.1 1 4 This Office has previously recommended that

the Department take this position with respect to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule.1"" As a matter of logic, no reason
appears why the Department should not take the same position
regarding the Massiah exclusionary rule, for the latter is as bereft of deterrent or other justification as the former.
Another less obvious point that could be made in this connection is that an existing statute"' forecloses suppression of incriminating statements that are made voluntarily, even if they
are made after indictment and in the absence of counsel. Section
3501 of Title 18, which was enacted in 1968, provides in subsection (a) that a confession-defined in subsection (e) to include
any self-incriminating statement-is admissible in a federal
criminal prosecution if it is voluntarily given. Subsection (b) directs the trial judge to take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including five
specifically designated factors, in determining the issue of voluntariness. One of the factors is whether the defendant was without the assistance of counsel when he was questioned and made
the confession.
Although section 3501 was enacted principally to overrule the
Miranda decision, 117 its text and legislative history can reasonably be read to support an argument that it should be construed
to govern the admissibility not only of pre-arraignment confessions, but of post-indictment incriminating statements as well.
Subsection (a) requires the admission of voluntary confessions
without reference to the time at which they are given. More telling yet, among the circumstances required by subsection (b) to
be considered by the trial judge in determining voluntariness is
the following: "(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of
the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession" (emphasis supplied). The underscored language contemplates the application
of subsection (a) to incriminating statements made after, as well
18
as before, the accused has been formally charged.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 92-107. This argument could also stress the
availability of such alternative deterrent and remedial devices as administrative measures-guidelines, training requirements, and disciplinary sanctions-and civil suits for
damages.
115. See RmEPoir No. 2, supra note 6, Part IV.A.1.
116. Enacted by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (18 U.S.C. § 3501).
117. See REP oRT No. 1, supra note 6, Part II.B.
118. This interpretation could be. supported by reference to the fourth consideration
listed in subsection (b)-"whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to ques-
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The legislative history of the statute supports the broad reading suggested by the text. Although it is apparent that Congress
was concerned primarily with the problems caused by Miranda,
and although the Committee Report contains no mention of
Massiah,the Committee Report plainly indicates a concern with
the Court's sixth amendment cases, as well as a purpose to go
beyond merely overturning Miranda. Thus, the Committee Report contains several references to the harmful effects of Escobedo v. Illinois,' 9 which was understood at the time to be based
on the sixth amendment right to counsel."1 0 In addition, in explaining the general purpose of the legislation, the report states:
[C]rime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals
who have voluntarily confessed their crimes are released
on mere technicalities. The traditional right of the people
to have their prosecuting attorneys place in evidence
before juries the voluntary confessions and incriminating
statements made by defendants simply must be
restored.""1
Moreover, several of the Committee's criticisms of Miranda are
also applicable to Massiah, albeit not necessarily with the same
1 22

force.

tioning of his right to the assistance of counsel." Since a person has no constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings
against him, see United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88 (1984); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972), we could argue that the statutory directive to consider
whether the person was advised of this right also indicates that § 3501 applies in a case
-in which the person's confession was made after he was formally charged.
119. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
120. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2112, 2127-31. Escobedo held that a person's sixth amendment
right to counsel is violated when, in the course of an investigation that has begun to
focus on him as a suspect, he is subjected to custodial interrogation without being
warned of his right to remain silent and after denial of his request to consult with his
lawyer. 378 U.S. at 490-91. The Court has since reinterpreted Escobedo, explaining that
counsel was required in that case "in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination rather than to vindicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 188 n.5.
121. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 120, at 37, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2123.
122. For example, the Senate Report stated:
One of the most damaging aspects of the Miranda decision is its apparent holding that, absent waiver, no suspect can be interrogated at all without the benefit
of counsel. It is widely known that counsel will advise the suspect to make no
statement at all. The police are virtually hamstrung. This is much more serious
than the barring from evidence of a confession-the suspect may refuse to make
any statement whatever.
Id. at 2134 (emphasis in original). Except for the fact that the police are not "ham-
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Finally, we can argue, there is no logical reason why the test of
voluntariness restored by section 3501 should not govern the admissibility of both pre-indictment and post-indictment statements. In either context, the interests of the accused are the
same, as are those of society, and in each context the statute
strikes a fair balance between competing values.'
The foregoing arguments are aimed at complete elimination of
the Massiah exclusionary rule. As an alternative, we could argue
that exclusion should be limited to situations in which the police
had no legitimate reason for surreptitious questioning of an indicted defendant other than to obtain inculpatory statements
for use at the trial of the pending charge. Except in such a situation, there is simply no police misconduct to deter and, therefore, no justification whatever for incurring the heavy costs associated with the suppression of reliable and probative evidence.'
This is an especially promising argument because it commanded
the support of four members of the -Court in Moulton 2 5 and because six Justices accepted a comparable argument in the fourth
amendment context in Leon. Because the two additional members of the Court who formed the majority in Leon-Justices
Powell and Blackmun-have previously expressed reservations
strung" in a Massiah-type situation, since they will already have accumulated enough
evidence to charge the suspect, this statement is as applicable to Massiah as to Miranda.
123. Another argument that might be made is that-regardless of the wisdom of the
exclusionary rule-the Court lacks the power to impose it even in the federal system.
Such an argument would require careful analysis of the Court's ill-defined "supervisory
power" over lower federal courts, an exercise that is beyond the scope of this Report but
that will be undertaken in a subsequent paper in this series. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY,
'U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTicE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JusincE' SERIES, REPORT No. 5, The Judiciary's Use of Supervisory Power to Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity (1987),
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 773 (1989). In essence, the argument would have two
prongs. The first point would be that the Court has no common law authority to establish rules of evidence for use in federal courts and that, even if it had such power, the
power would be limited to the prescription of rules designed to ensure the accuracy of
the factfinding process, a goal that the exclusionary rule plainly does not serve. The
second point would be that the existence of such limited authority to lay down rules of
evidence (assuming that it does exist) does not permit the Court-in the guise of performing that function-to control the behavior of Executive Branch officials. So far as we
are aware, the Court's authority has never been challenged in either of these respects. It
might, therefore, be futile and damaging to the Department's credibility to advance such
an argument at this late date. Moreover, such an argument might well irritate the Court,
to the possible disadvantage of our primary arguments, which are strong standing by
.themselves.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 92-107.
125. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 190-92 (1985) (Burger, C.J., joined by
•White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
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about Massiah,2 e it may not be too much to hope that a majority of the Court will accept the views of the dissenters in
Moulton in a case in which the facts are more favorable to the
government.
C. Specific Recommendations
In view of Maine v. Moulton and Michigan v. Jackson in the
current Term, a frontal assault on Massiah would probably be
quixotic unless the composition or thinking of the Court were to
change further. Accordingly, current reform efforts should be directed toward the more modest goal of eliminating or limiting
Massiah's exclusionary rule component. The following specific
strategies are recommended to achieve that goal.
1. Litigative Strategy
Even though the Court remains devoted to Massiah, the Department should continue to avail itself of litigative opportunities to express its fundamental disagreement with the notion
that the sixth amendment includes a right not to be questioned.
Second, the Department should continue to urge judicial elimination or modification of Massiah's exclusionary rule. In addition to making the usual case against suppression of reliable and
probative evidence, the Department should also contend that
the voluntariness standard reestablished by the enactment of 18
U.S.C. § 3501 precludes automatic application of an exclusionary rule in the sixth amendment context, just as it does in fifth
amendment cases. However, it would be better to reserve this
argument until after the statute has been upheld under the fifth
amendment. Such a strategy would avoid jeopardizing efforts to
obtain the abrogation of Miranda-amore important goal to the
government than abolition of the Massiah exclusionary
rule-and a prior declaration of the statute's validity as a standard for the admissibility of pre-charge confessions would probably enhance the prospects of a similar decision in the context of
post-charge incriminating statements.
126. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 275-77 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 277-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Willis, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring); id. at 438-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Legislative Strategy

As a supplement to its litigative strategy, the Department
should also consider whether it would be advisable to seek legislation specifically abrogating Massiah's exclusionary rule, either
in toto or in cases in which incriminating statements are obtained during bona fide investigations of separate crimes. Consideration of this course is recommended, even though we may
be arguing simultaneously in court that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 already
achieves the same result. The two strategies are not mutually
exclusive. Moreover, it will take some time to secure a definitive
judicial determination of the validity-and scope of section 3501,
and that determination could be adverse to the government, at
least in the sense that the Court may conclude that the statute-even though constitutional-was not intended to govern
the admissibility of post-indictment confessions.
A proposal to eliminate or modify the Massiah exclusionary
rule could be offered either in a separate bill or as an amendment to proposed legislation to create a statutory "good faith"
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. A bill directed solely to the sixth amendment exclusionary rule probably
'would not have sufficient appeal to be enacted. 12 7 Chances of
passage would be greater if the proposal were included in a
package of other worthwhile reforms.12 8 On the other hand, an
effort to broaden an exclusionary rule bill would create a new set
of legislative obstacles that might seriously jeopardize the bill's
prospects of success. In addition, if an amendment were offered
to proposed legislation limited to establishing a "good faith" exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, it would
127. Although it seriously impedes the search for truth, Massiah cannot fairly be
equated with Mapp and Miranda in this respect, because it requires suppression of evidence in far fewer cases, and in those cases there is at least enough other evidence to
have warranted the commencement of prosecution. Thus, even strenuous efforts to educate Congress and the public concerning Massiah's harmful effects, see infra Part
IV.C.4., might not generate a critical mass of support for enactment of a bill dealing only
with Massiah's exclusionary rule.
128. It is anticipated that this Office's 'Truth in Criminal Justice' project will identify
.other aspects of federal criminal procedure warranting remedial legislation. In addition,
a more comprehensive bill could include an amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act
.to provide a damage remedy against the United States for egregious violations of the
Massiah right not to he questioned. This right can now be vindicated by means of a
:Bivens suit against the responsible federal agents. However, unlike the situation with
respect to violations of fourth amendment rights by federal law enforcement officers not
acting in good faith, see Norton v. Turner, 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1003 (1978); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982), federal law currently provides no means of
redress against the government itself.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:3 & 4

probably be necessary to accept a similar limitation on an
amendment dealing with the Massiah exclusionary rule.
3. Investigative and Administrative Strategy
In light of the acceptability of the use of electronic surveillance and passive informants to gather incriminating statements
concerning pending charges from a defendant after the commencement-of judicial proceedings, the Department should continue to utilize these techniques when necessary to amass
enough evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial.1 29 In addition, the government should not hesitate to use
undercover informants to deliberately elicit evidence concerning
an indicted defendant's participation in additional criminal activity-with respect to which he has no right to counsel because
he has not been charged-even when there is reason to believe
that he may make incriminating statements regarding the offense with which he has already been charged.
Administrative initiatives should also be taken to ensure
against misuse of these permissible investigative techniques and
to demonstrate the feasibility and reliability of administrative
alternatives to the sixth amendment exclusionary rule. Thus, to
the extent that they do not already exist in all federal law enforcement agencies, the Department should develop written
guidelines and procedures for the conduct of investigations of
persons under indictment.' 80 Those provisions should be
designed to meet current constitutional requirements, but
should take full advantage of existing exceptions to those re129. As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 82-84, there is no sound
basis for concern that the ethical prohibition on communication by an attorney with an
opposing party who is represented by counsel applies to conversation between an informant and a represented defendant. A fortiori, there should be no concern on this score
when passive methods are used to receive incriminating statements, since these techniques do not involve "communication" by an agent of the government, much less by an
attorney for the government. For a very thorough examination of the applicability of the
prohibition to communications by the Department with represented persons in criminal
cases, see Memorandum dated January 29, 1984, to Stephen S. Trott from William J.
Landers, Re: Communication with Represented Persons in Criminal Matters and DR 7104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
130. The FBI's guidelines require a warning and waiver of the right to counsel before
an accused who has been formally charged is questioned about the pending charge, see
FBI LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS. supra note 106, at § 7-3.2(1)(d), 7-3.2(4), but
they do not appear to cover the use of covert techniques to obtain incriminating statements in such a situation. This Office has been advised informally, however, that the use
of electronic surveillance or a passive informant for this purpose is permitted with the
approval of FBI headquarters.
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quirements. Finally, to ensure that the guidelines and procedures are followed, the Department should review-and improve
if necessary-existing mechanisms for monitoring post-indictment investigations and for imposing appropriate disciplinary
sanctions in the event of serious noncompliance with the guidelines and procedures.

4.

Educational Strategy

The relatively poor prospects of obtaining immediate judicial
or legislative relief from the Massiah doctrine can be attributed
in part to a lack of public awareness of the irrational and damaging state of the law in this area. Unlike the Miranda decision,
which was greeted by immediate and widespread outrage, Massiah and its progeny seem to have received very little public attention, and have not generated much controversy. It would be
desirable for the Department, therefore, to undertake a "consciousness raising" program aimed at making the Massiah doctrine a more visible public issue. Steps to this end could include
preparation of a law review article based on this Report for publication, preparation and dissemination to journalists of a distillation of this Report, Op Ed pieces, and critical appraisals of the
Massiah line of cases in criminal law speeches by Department
officials.
Two closely related points should be stressed in our discussion
of the subject. First, we should emphasize the distinction between the right incorporated by the Founders in the sixth
amendment and the right created by the Court in Massiah. This
can best be done by avoiding characterizations employed by the
Court, such as "the Massiah right to counsel," and by speaking
instead of "the Massiah 'right' not to be questioned." Second,
we should take pains to allay apprehensions-unfounded though
they would be-that elimination or modification of the Massiah
doctrine, or of its exclusionary rule component, would impair the
utility of the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel
at trial or during pretrial confrontations at which the presence
of counsel would protect the fairness and the integrity of the
truth-finding process of a subsequent trial. Clarification of these
points would assuage legitimate concerns and should make it
easier to persuade the public and members of Congress of the
merits of our substantive arguments for reform.
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CONCLUSION

Despite intermittent efforts by the Court to justify Massiah's
expansion of the sixth amendment right to counsel, the rationale
of that decision remains an enigma. Massiah continues to thwart
the search for truth in criminal investigations and prosecutions
by prohibiting the use of legitimate investigative techniques and
by requiring the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence
whose use would not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In
effect, the Massiah right not to be questioned and the Massiah
exclusionary rule amount to obstructions of justice. The Department should intensify its efforts to correct this anomalous situation. Although it may not be immediately feasible to seek to reverse Massiah's conception of the right to counsel, there remains
a reasonable possibility of limiting or eliminating Massiah's exclusionary rule. That goal may be attainable by employing the
litigative, legislative, administrative, and outreach strategies recommended above.

